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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  extent  to which  REDD+  initiatives  should  be a mechanism  to  address  poverty  and  provide  other
co-beneﬁts  apart  from  carbon  storage,  is hotly  debated.  Here,  we  examine  the  beneﬁt  distribution  policy
and  practice  of  a  prominent  REDD+  project  in  Kenya  with  the  aim of understanding  the  extent  to which  it
addresses  equity.  We  reveal  that  while  the project  design  was  attentive  to  equity  concerns  in distributing
beneﬁts  amongst  the  project  implementer,  landowners  and  the  wider  population  of small-scale  farmers
and  pastoralists  in the  area, in practice,  the  initial  ﬂow  of  beneﬁts  were  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a
few.  This  was  because  developments  in  land  tenure  since  pre-colonial  times  had  involved  processes  of
dispossession  and  elite  capture,  enabled  by colonial  and  post-colonial  land  policies  that left the majorityenya
eneﬁt sharing
mall-scale farmers
and tenure
quity
of  local  people  with  little  or  no  land  entitlement.  As  the  distributive  policy  of  the project  maps  onto  the
existing  unequal  land  distribution,  it reinforces  inequality.  By  illustrating  how  current,  well-intended,
REDD+  efforts  inadvertently  come  to entrench  a long  process  of  dispossession  of  marginalized  people,
we  call  attention  to the  pivotal  importance  that  historical  context  plays  in  discussions  of  equity  and  social
safeguards  related  to  implementing  REDD+  initiatives  and  related  policy.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
lus forest conservation, sustainable management of forests and
nhancement of carbon stocks (REDD+) aims to cut carbon diox-
de emissions from forest land, thereby mitigating climate change
Angelsen and Brockhaus, 2009). The implementation of REDD+
s proposed at three scales: national, subnational and nested
pproaches (Karsenty et al., 2014; Minang and van Noordwijk,
013). In 2007, the Bali Action Plan called for REDD+ pilot and
emonstration activities in preparation for the national and nested
cales (UNFCCC, 2007). Since then, many actors, including the pri-
ate sector and state, have initiated many REDD+ projects. This
tudy concerns a private sector REDD+ intervention at a subnational
evel.
Project level activities were encouraged under the Bali Action
lan (UNFCCC, 2007; Dec 2/CP.13) and the Cancun agreements
UNFCCC, 2011; Dec. 1/CP.16) as part of REDD+ readiness and
esults-based demonstration approaches towards national level
∗ Corresponding author. Fax: +254207224001.
E-mail address: schomba@gmail.com (S. Chomba).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.09.021
264-8377/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article 
/).license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
implementation. Under the private sector, REDD+ is promoted as a
cost-effective tool that can generate economic rents, while reduc-
ing global CO2 emissions at minimum cost (Bernard et al., 2012;
Karsenty et al., 2014). Efﬁcient reduction in carbon emission has
thus been the raison d’être of REDD+ (Di Gregorio et al., 2013). A
hotly debated issue surrounding REDD+ is how much such mea-
sures should adhere to social safeguards, address equity concerns
and provide other co-beneﬁts beyond carbon storage, such as bio-
diversity conservation and poverty alleviation (Brown et al., 2008;
Cotula and Mayers, 2009).
The Cancun agreements reached during COP  16 in Mexico in
2010 included social safeguards aimed at addressing various equity
concerns under REDD+. Speciﬁcally, Appendix 1 of the agreements
state that REDD+ “must support respect for knowledge and rights
of indigenous people and forest dependent communities” (UNFCCC,
2011; Dec. 1/CP.16, Appendix 1). Second, the guidelines stress the
need to enhance other social and environmental beneﬁts, including
poverty alleviation. Third, they stress the need for “full and effec-
tive participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous
people and local communities” (UNFCCC, 2011). These safeguards
underscore a commitment towards procedural and distributive
aspects of equity from international to local levels under REDD+
mechanisms (Di Gregorio et al., 2013), but leave distributive equity
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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Rukinga ranch, which formed Phase I of the project. Wildlife Works
has its Kenyan subsidiaries; Wildlife Works Sanctuary (WWS)  that
deals with the actual project implementation and sale of carbon;S. Chomba et al. / Land U
o country driven social safeguards, aligned to national develop-
ent priorities.
A key issue in implementing REDD+ initiatives is how they act
pon a pre-existing situation of inequality amongst people living in
r near to forests (Di Gregorio et al., 2013; Peskett et al., 2011). The
uestion then becomes whether and how current REDD+ efforts
cknowledge and seek to include existing structural elements of
nequality as part of enacting social safeguards (McDermott et al.,
013). If they do not do so effectively, then REDD+ efforts may  come
o, albeit inadvertently, entrench structural inequality while only
ffering token beneﬁts to marginalized people.
As REDD+ continues to unfold in practice it is important to take
tock of these aspects. Accordingly, this study focuses on how one of
he world’s most prominent REDD+ projects, the Kasigau Corridor
EDD Project (KCRP) in Kenya, addresses equity among project par-
icipants and residents in and around the area in which it operates.
peciﬁcally, the research addresses two questions:
. How has the project addressed equity in beneﬁt distribution?
. What is the role of the historical context in shaping equity in the
distribution of REDD+ beneﬁts?
The paper is structured so that the next section outlines the
esearch methods. We  then explain the analytical framework which
inks resource tenure with equity in access to beneﬁts. The results
rom analysis of the KCRP case are then presented, followed by dis-
ussion of their implications. The concluding section incorporates
olicy recommendations.
. Background to the case study area
KCRP is located in Taita Taveta County, Republic of Kenya. The
rea lies approximately 150 km northwest of the coastal city of
ombasa in between Tsavo East and Tsavo West national parks
Fig. 1). The climate is semi-arid (annual rainfall of 300–450 mm;
ltitude is 450–1000 m)  with vegetation consisting of a compos-
te of forests types, with Acacia-Commiphora dominant. There are
emnant patches of montane forest, especially in the hilly parts.
The population of the area is comprised mainly of the Wataita
ho are subsistence agriculturalists practicing crop farming, live-
tock keeping and small scale trade. The second largest group is
he Waduruma, who have immigrated from the neighboring Kwale
ounty over a long time period. Other minor ethnic groups in the
rea such as the Wakamba and Wakikuyu are found mainly in the
ain settlements, such as Voi.
Fig. 1 illustrates the mosaic of tenure arrangements, including
arious categories of ranches (all pink, blue and orange polygons),
ettlement areas (polygons 32, 33 and 34), large scale sisal estates
polygons 29, 30 and 31) and protected areas (National Parks)
hat exist within the study area. The settlement areas comprise
umerous villages, and are excluded from carbon accounting by
he project. According to the evidence accumulated through colo-
ial and post-colonial maps, much of the present settlement areas
ccupy land previously designated as native reserves by the colo-
ial government (KLC, 1934; pg. 2722–2725; Nazzaro, 1981; Verbi,
939). For instance, Dabida and Sagalla, allocated as reserves for
ative settlement by the colonial government in the early 20th cen-
ury, were located where current settlement areas 34 and 33 now
re. The Maungu-Buguta settlement scheme, (part of polygon 32)
erives from post-colonial settlement.
Ranches were established during the 1960s and 1970s for the
ataita1 to use for cattle production, but legal ownership was
1 Ranches were also established elsewhere across the country, particularly in
reas occupied by pastoralists, such as the Maasai (Mwangi 2005; Veit, 2011). Thislicy 50 (2016) 202–213 203
concentrated amongst a small Wataita elite, as discussed below.
Ranch owners have long-term, renewable leases issued by the gov-
ernment, usually for 33, 66 or 99 years, or whatever remains on
the lease at the time of acquisition. According to Ministry of Lands
records, two  ranches Amaka, and Ndara B (polygons 11 and 24)
were freehold. Cattle production was discontinued on most ranches
in the 1980s and 1990s largely because of unfavorable international
market conditions, mismanagement resulting in over grazing and
degradation, and natural calamities such as drought (Njogu, 2004).
The collapse of cattle ranching left most ranches indebted with
loans acquired from the Agricultural Finance Corporation to run
their ranching activities (Njogu 2004; Veit, 2011). A few ranches
still raise cattle for meat production today, but on a very small scale
(e.g., Kasigau ranch, polygon 4). Most ranch owners are absentee
landowners, residing in urban areas within or outside Taita. Some
ranches are rented out to camel-keeping pastoralists of Somali
descent for minimal fees; others are left unused. The absence of
major economic activity on ranches, combined with absenteeism,
paved the way for progressive encroachment by people from the
neighboring settlement areas practicing slash and burn agriculture
and charcoal production.
The KCRP commenced in 2008–2009 with phase I (polygon
9) covering a single privately owned ranch of about 30,000 ha
known as Rukinga. Phase II followed in 2010–2011 drawing in
13 ranches, covering 169,7312 ha. Establishment of Phase III was
ongoing while data for the present study were being collected;
involving a number of the remaining ranches and was  anticipated to
extend over approximately 190,000 ha (Fig. 1) possibly including a
non-contiguous block in the nearby Shimba hills. After their estab-
lishment, the phases run concurrently, anticipated to continue for a
period of 30 years. Carbon beneﬁts through the sale of credits from
Phase I accrue only to the owners of Rukinga ranch; they are not
distributed to the wider community. The present study focused on
Phase II of the project, comprising the community owned ranches
and disbursal of carbon revenue to communities in the settlement
areas.
The 13 ranches under Phase II had various forms of ownership:
ﬁve of the ranches were under individual ownership (i.e., owned by
one or two persons); four were owned by private companies (PCs)
limited to 50 shareholders, and four under Directed Agricultural
Companies (DACs) with membership based on share ownership
(Table 1). Individually owned and private company ranches were
legal entities with full rights of use and exclusion of their prop-
erty, while DACs were communal ranches, owned mainly by ethnic
Wataita, based around kinship ties and traditional land rights,
under the directorship of a representative from the Ministry of
Agriculture. The decline in revenue from 2010 to 2011 represents
a reduction in sale of carbon credits in the voluntary markets.
In addition, two  small parcels of communal land in Marungu
hills (approximately 1019 ha) and a wildlife corridor (approx.
156 ha) also form part of the project, and the revenue generated
from sale of carbon from these areas is distributed to the Marungu
community through a committee.
The project proponent is Wildlife Works, an American based
Private Corporation, founded in 1997 by Mike Korchinsky (WW,
2014b), who is also the majority shareholder and director ofwas under the Kenya Livestock Development Project (KLDP), supported by the gov-
ernment and ﬁnanced by international donors.
2 The total area of area under ranches is 168,556 ha; the total area of the ranches
plus  the communal land under Marungu Hills (1,019 ha) and the wildlife corridor
(156 ha) is 169,731 ha.
204 S. Chomba et al. / Land Use Policy 50 (2016) 202–213
Fig. 1. Map  of the study area showing phase I, phase II and proposed phase III polygons comprising the ranches included in each phase of the project, settlement areas, sisal
estates  and protected areas. (For interpretation of the references to color in the text, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 1
Ranches involved in KCRP phase II.
Name of ranch Year of registration Form of land ownership Size (ha) Revenue received from sale
of  carbon credits (US $)
Year 2010 Year 2011
Taita 1964 Private company 35,612 294,690 143,382
Sagalla 1967 Private company 17,402 126,544 61,570
Maungu 1970 Directed Agricultural Company (DAC) 21,619 210,545 102,441
Mgeno 1972 DAC 21,232 210,410 107,240
Ndara 1971 Individual (1 owner) 1,835 18,225 8,867
Kasigau 1971 DAC 21,186 171,699 83,540
Wangalla 1968 Individuals (2 owners) 2,024 12,648 6,154
Choke 1968 Individual (1 owner) 5,076 38,948 18,950
Amaka 1972 Individual (1 owner) 5,998 38,378 18,673
Kutima 1974 Individuals (2 owners) 5,076 49,304 23,989
Washumbu 1972 Private Company 14,501 90,782 44,170
Dawida 1973 Private Company 4,047 43,005 20,924
Kambanga 1974 DAC 12,948 107,428 52,269
Totals 168,556 1,412,606 692,169
Sources: Taita Taveta District Annual Report (1972); Interviews with the chairman of the ranchers association; KCRP revenue records.
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hile Wildlife Works Carbon Trust (WWCT) deals with distribu-
ion of beneﬁts to local communities involved in the project. WWCT
orks with other local level institutions, referred to as Location Car-
on Committees (LCC) and Community Based Organizations (CBO),
o facilitate carbon revenue allocation among various community
rojects (Chomba, 2015).
The project is veriﬁed under the two leading international stan-
ards: Veriﬁed Carbon Standards (VCS) and Climate, Community
nd Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA). The two standards have com-
lementary requirements: VCS focuses on the rigor of carbon
ccounting and CCBA on social and environment aspects associ-
ted with the development of the project (Kolmuss et al., 2008). The
roject is certiﬁed at GOLD level, the highest level of certiﬁcation
nder CCBA.
It is estimated that the project will avoid emissions of over
8 million metric tonnes of CO2 over the project period of 30
ears (KCRP, 2011). The emissions are avoided through reduced
eforestation and forest degradation, achieved by protecting areas
ainly from slash and burn agriculture and charcoal produc-
ion. The project provides ﬁnancial incentives, through distributing
evenue from the sale of carbon credits back to communities,
andowners and to project implementation. The project also
mploys approximately 400 people, mainly from the local area, in
unning its operations, including an export-processing factory for
lothing. The carbon is sold on the voluntary market (see Kolmuss
t al., 2008).
. Methods
.1. Data collection and analysis
Intensive ﬁeldwork was carried out from March 2013 to April
014 by the ﬁrst two authors as part of their respective PhD
esearch. In addition, two research assistants conversant in local
anguages and customs were employed to assist with data col-
ection. Mixed methods approaches were employed to capture
hree analytical categories of primary interest: contemporary
enure arrangements, distributive equity and historical evolution
f tenure.
Background information was obtained through a review of
roject documents prepared by the KCRP for the purpose of inter-
ational validation and accreditation of carbon credits through
he CCBA and VCS standards, as well as project websites (KCRP,
009,2011; WW,  2014a,b). This focused on identifying which actors
eceived what kind of beneﬁts; as well any stated policies on tenure
nd beneﬁt distribution. Financial records on carbon revenue allo-
ation amongst various actors in the project were also gathered.
Data on contemporary tenure arrangements and beneﬁt dis-
ribution by the project were collected through semi-structured
nterviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). A total of 34 semi-
tructured interviews and ﬁve FGDs, involving a further 46 people,
ere carried out. Four groups of informants were approached: (i)
CRP project staff, (ii) ranch owners (for ranches in individual and
artnership ownership), (iii) committee members (for private com-
any ranches and DACs), and (iv) residents of the settlement areas.
nterview respondents were selected through snow balling (Noy,
008), where initial informants suggest others of the same cate-
ory, a technique we applied particularly to reach the ranch owners
ho were difﬁcult to approach without being introduced by other
anch owners.
In addition, a semi-structured questionnaire was  administeredcross 120 randomly selected households in two out of the ﬁve
ocations: Marungu and Kasigau. The questionnaire aimed at pro-
iding descriptive data on land ownership and ownership of shares
n various forms of companies, and how this conditioned access tolicy 50 (2016) 202–213 205
project beneﬁts. The criteria for selecting the two  locations were:
(i) they contained all four categories of tenure arrangements (small
holders, and the three types of ranches); and (ii) they were eth-
nically diverse and hence provided access to ethnic groups other
than the Wataita present in the project area. The surveys aimed
at acquiring a general description of the relationship of people to
land and project beneﬁts in the area, rather than to make statisti-
cal comparisons across sites. The questionnaire was pretested and
reduced to a set of 15 key questions, which took approximately
45 min  to administer. It was  administered to household heads, but
in practice, many men  were not at home and so their wives were
interviewed resulting in almost equal numbers of male and female
respondents. The questionnaire data were analyzed using SPSS 20.
To capture the historical evolution of land tenure, claims, con-
ﬂicts and dispossessions over time, historical records and maps
were also gathered from the Kenya National Archives, Ministry of
Lands and Taita Taveta County ofﬁces. These included: Taita Taveta
District development plans, annual reports, research reports, colo-
nial and post-colonial administrative reports and maps, as well as
the Carter/Kenya Land Commission report 1933–1934’s section on
Coast province, Taita Taveta district.
The notions of equity addressed in this paper were primarily
based on inter-household and community distribution of beneﬁts.
Intra-household dynamics, particularly with respect to gender are
addressed elsewhere (Kariuki and Birner, 2015). Ethical require-
ments were taken into consideration by ensuring full explanation
of the purpose of the study to all respondents. Respondents were
then asked whether or not they wished to participate. Considering
the overall sensitivity of issues under study, names of individual
respondents were anonymized in the reporting of results.
3.2. Analytical framework
To analyze equity, we  draw on the framework developed
by McDermott et al. (2013), which distinguishes between three
dimensions of equity: contextual, procedural and distributive.
The framework was  originally developed for analyzing equity
under Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes but has
been applied to REDD+ interventions, building on the notion that
carbon storage is an environmental service, conferring REDD+
schemes many similarities with other PES initiatives (Schroeder
and McDermott, 2014). This paper focuses mainly on contextual
aspects of equity that condition the other two  dimensions, and dis-
tributive aspects that represent the outcome (Fig. 2). Procedural
aspects, such as obtaining free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)
by communities at the outset and community representation in the
project, are included only in terms of how they are conditioned by
context and inﬂuence distribution.
Equity can be measured in many ways and with reference to dif-
ferent contexts, which implies that attention to contextual equity
is both important and challenging. In this paper, contextual dimen-
sions of equity refer to the “pre-existing conditions that inﬂuence
the ability of various actors in REDD+, particularly local communi-
ties, to participate in and beneﬁt from REDD+” (Visseren-Hamakers
et al., 2012, p. 649). Contextual equity takes into account the uneven
playing ﬁeld created by the pre-existing social, economic and polit-
ical conditions under which people engage in and beneﬁt from,
resource distributions; thereby limiting or enabling their capacity
for both. The distributive dimension of equity entails the economic
distribution of costs, risks and beneﬁts among pre-existing tenure
right holders and resource users. In the REDD+ debate, distributive
equity pits two divergent schools of thought against each other:
the market economists and the rights-based advocates. The market
economists argue that REDD+ should be pursued cost-efﬁciently
through market-based mechanisms. They argue against carbon
rights and instead advocate carbon easements as compensation by
206 S. Chomba et al. / Land Use Policy 50 (2016) 202–213
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rig. 2. The three core dimensions of equity identiﬁed from review of the justice liter
tudy. Shaded arrows show immediate causal inﬂuence, un-shaded arrows show fe
nvestors in REDD+ to land owners, largely ignoring people who  do
ot own land (Karsenty et al., 2014). They ask questions like ‘must
ll climate researchers also be responsible for analyzing all under-
ying social issues?” (Ribot, 2014:32). By contrast, rights-based
dvocates emphasize a “pro poor” REDD+ that not only compen-
ates foregone beneﬁts, but also improves the livelihoods of the
ural poor, particularly those adversely affected by such projects.
hey recognize wealth disparities, as well as the existence of inse-
ure and unclear tenure and advocate for a mechanism that takes
ognizance of these disparities in its dispensation of beneﬁts, while
dvocating for governments to move ahead and make tenure clear
nd secure (Brown et al., 2008; Cotula and Mayers, 2009). Proce-
ural equity, links tenure rights with other governance aspects,
articularly under the rights-based school of thought. Procedu-
al equity entails aspects of community participation in REDD+
roject-level activities, aspects of FPIC agreements, transparency
f forest carbon revenue ﬂow and access to conﬂict resolution
echanisms (Lawlor et al., 2010; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012).
rocedure may  be a tool for inﬂuencing distributive outcomes,
o address rights-based disparity, ultimately generating feedbacks
hat shift contextual equity over time (McDermott et al., 2013).
. Results
.1. Distribution of beneﬁts
The results on distributive equity are presented in relation to
quity at the project level, and then at the community level.
.1.1. Project level
At the project distribution level, revenue from the sale of car-on credits is distributed between the project implementer, ranch
wners, and the communities in the settlement areas. The princi-
le behind the distribution was simply referred to as a “one third
atio” by community respondents and project ofﬁcials, suggestingby McDermott et al. (2013) and their main interactions in the context of the present
ks that may  generate change over time.
that approximately equal proportions of revenue were distributed
to the ranch owners, the project and the communities (Bernard
et al., 2014; Project ofﬁcial 1. personal communication, 12th March
2014). In practice, the revenue was distributed according to a
sequential logic that led to the land owners being paid ﬁrst, then
project costs were deducted, and the remainder was available for
distribution to local communities.
The ranch owners had signed 30-year contractual agreements
entitling them to a third of the revenue from sales of carbon cred-
its. These agreements are similar to conservation easements—they
give non-consumptive rights, in this case carbon, otherwise held by
the landowner, to the project implementer in exchange for deﬁned
payments (Bernard et al., 2014). After deducting the ranch owner
allocation, the project then deducted costs associated with the pro-
duction of carbon credits and wider aims of wildlife conservation,
including payment of forest and wildlife guards employed by the
project, costs for monitoring carbon, biodiversity and livelihoods,
and other staff costs. The communities then received the remain-
ing revenue, making them residual claimants of the carbon monies.
Unlike the ranch owners, the communities did not have legally
binding agreements with the project, indicating the proportion of
revenue they must receive, although they had publicly discussed
and agreed to participate in the project, based upon the principle
of free prior and informed consent (FPIC).
The resulting distribution of revenue (based on the sale of carbon
in 2010 and 2011) saw project costs amounting to more than half
of the carbon revenue, while communities (smallholders) received
less than one sixth, and the ranch owners their guaranteed one
third share of the total revenue (Fig. 3).
Project staff were aware that the proposed one-third beneﬁt-
sharing ratio was not always realized, and attributed this to low
carbon prices and an inability to sell all the credits generated:
“So far we have sold 1.2 million tons of carbon. The prices are not
so good; (. . .). We  have not managed to sell all volumes of carbon
produced; we actually sell an average of 300,000 to 400,000 tons
S. Chomba et al. / Land Use Po
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“Although events occurred in the past, we  live their consequences
today and must act upon them now. What has already occurred is
in front of us, because that is where it can be corrected”
3 Most ranches revealed their overall share capital but they were unwilling to
reveal how shares were distributed among members as they argued that theseFig. 3. Average distribution of revenues from carbon sale in 2010 and 2011.
ource: KCRP ﬁnancial data.
per year- because we don’t want to sell them when the prices are too
low. Effectively, we cannot implement the one-third ratio of beneﬁt
sharing at the moment because the money is not enough. When the
money comes.  . .we prioritize. . . the project has to keep running, so
we deduct actual costs ﬁrst, which include the costs of about 365
[400] employees, costs for annual monitoring and veriﬁcation, etc.
Then the landowners must receive one third of the money, because
it is contractual. The remainder, which is usually less than one third,
goes to the community. But this is not going to be like this for long,
as we are looking at better carbon prices in the future, (. . .),  as well
as expanding the project to include more ranches in phase III.  . .”
Project ofﬁcial, 12th March 2014.
.1.2. Community level
The proportion of the revenue going towards the communities
14%) was divided equally between the ﬁve administrative loca-
ions in which the project operated: each was allocated USD 50,000
n 2010 and 85,000 in 2011, i.e., a total of USD 135,000 over the two
ear period. Considering that the population of the locations as per
he 2009 census (GoK, 2009a) ranges from 9000 for Marungu to
4,000 in Mwatate and Mwachabo, this gives average annual rev-
nue of USD 5–8 per household. As this would be insigniﬁcant if
istributed per household, funds were disbursed by WWCT  with
he help of LCCs and CBOs, to communal projects such as con-
truction of water catchment areas, classrooms, medical clinics
r bursaries to cover students’ school fees. The limitations in the
xtent to which community based organisations have led to local
mpowerment in Kenya in the context of revenue distribution from
orest management has been explored elsewhere (Chomba et al.,
015).
The one-third of the revenue distributed to the landowners was
ivided between them on the basis of carbon credits generated
rom their ranches. For instance, each landowner received between
S$ 18,402 and 73,293 in 2011 and 2012 as carbon revenue. PCs
nd DACs would then share the revenue among their shareholders
with a maximum of 50 shareholders for PCs, and a big range in
umbers of shares in the DACs). Some PCs gave each shareholder
n equal amount of revenue irrespective of the number of shares
eld, while others issued dividends based on the number of shares
ach member held.
DACs are communal ranches with no legally deﬁned maximum
hareholding. Instead, registered members had bought variable
umbers of shares since their formation in 1960s and 1970s. There
as a relatively wide distribution of membership and shares in
ACs among community members. Although DAC membershiplicy 50 (2016) 202–213 207
represented one way  in which community members got direct cash
beneﬁt from the project, not all residents had shares. According to
our survey results from the two  locations, almost half (46.7%) of the
sampled population in Kasigau location had shares in DACs, while
this was  less than one ﬁfth (16.4%) in Marungu location. The mean
number of shares per household across the two locations was 58,
but the distribution was highly skewed with most households hav-
ing between 5 and 30 shares, while a few individuals had more
than 2000. Carbon revenue received by DACs was partly used to
cover costs for managing the DACs, and the rest was distributed as
dividends to the shareholders. In a majority of the DACs, dividends
issued were proportional to the number of shares held by each per-
son or household. They were paid out at Ksh 10 (approximately US
$ 0.12 in July 2013) in Kasigau ranch and Ksh 100 (approximately
US$ 1.12 in July 2013) in Maungu ranch.
The revenue from the project implied that shares in DACs
became a potentially lucrative investment. All DAC leaders indi-
cated a growing interest among non-shareholders in joining DACs
since the onset of the project. Yet, DACs, which operated on inter-
nally formulated constitutions and regulations, selectively allowed
new members to join, while some froze issuing of new shares and
membership altogether. Interview respondents associated these
restrictions with perceived limits to income from carbon and the
unwillingness to share a modest pot amongst a high number of will-
ing newcomers. Thus although DACs did not have a legal restriction
on membership like private companies or partnerships, they were,
in practice, limiting new entrants.
Overall, the beneﬁts received and costs borne are dispropor-
tionately spread across different groups. The big winners in the
carbon revenue distribution model were the private land owners
who were guaranteed to receive their share of a third of all carbon
proceeds, allocated according to the contribution of carbon from
their ranches. In addition, some of them were also shareholders in
DACs and PCs, increasing their overall share of the carbon revenue.
For instance, a clerk in the Taita Taveta County council upon inde-
pendence in 1963 had his own (family) ranch; and was  also the
chairman of at least one PC and one DAC. He was  named as the
majority3 shareholder in the PC and DAC, besides having shares
in other ranches. Other people, who had held high public ofﬁce at
one time or another, had used their political and ﬁnancial capital
to gain private land and/or buy shares. They were also major ben-
eﬁciaries of carbon revenue. Owning a large number of shares also
implied tenure in that, should the parcels of land be subdivided in
future, each member would receive a size proportionate to his or
her shares. On the other hand, the big losers were the smallholder
farmers who  bore the opportunity cost of avoiding deforestation
(Fischer et al., 2011), and received very modest beneﬁts per capita.
They also bore the brunt of the cumulative failure of the forest
carbon markets because of coming last in the sequential payment
process, resulting in them receiving only 14% of the revenue, far
less than the 33% share anticipated at the outset.
4.2. Evolution of present day tenuredetails were private and would cause discontent among members if they were made
public. However a majority of the small shareholders did not have reservations in
revealing their own  number of shares and dividends received through the household
survey.
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native populations as the letter from a white missionary, addressed
to the district colonial administrator in 1939 indicated:08 S. Chomba et al. / Land U
A saying by the Bolivian Cumbales, J. Rappaport 1998 in Bender
nd Winer (2001, p. 27).
In the previous section, we described how the present bene-
t distribution is highly dependent on tenure arrangements and
avored a few landowners. In this section, we outline how the
resent tenure arrangements came to be, from pre-colonial, to
olonial and post-colonial periods, with speciﬁc emphasis on land
ispossession and agrarian segregation by the colonial government,
ost-colonial land consolidation and formation of ranches, until the
ollapse of the ranches and the entry of the carbon project.
Before the colonial period, tenure arrangements in the study
rea, as in much of the country, were characterized by various forms
f communal system, governed through a mix  of customary and
ndividual tenure systems (Njogu, 2004; Rutten, 1997). The Wataita
ived atop three large hills, Dabida, Sagalla and Kasigau, where the
limate was favorable for farming. They had settlement areas and
razing and hunting areas. Land used for settlement, which was
ainly in the hills, was held individually through kinship ties, i.e.,
nce someone arrived and made a claim over a piece of land, no
ne else would make claims over the same land (Njogu, 2004). The
lains were utilized communally for seasonal grazing and hunting,
articularly during drought. In non-drought seasons, they avoided
he plains, in order to keep away from wild animals and other ethnic
roups such as the Maasai and Kamba who occasionally raided their
attle. However, both hills and plains were seen as indivisible parts
f their territory (Njogu, 2004). Consequently, land availability and
ccess was not a problem, with vast areas, particularly in the plains,
emaining uninhabited (KLC, 1934; Nazzarro, 1974).
The transition from communal to other forms of private prop-
rty began with the colonial4 administration (1895–1963). Through
arious colonial land policies, the land tenure system changed
ramatically within a relatively short period of time. The ﬁrst
et of policies were the crown land ordinances of 1901–1902,
hich declared land in Kenya as “crown land” implying that it was
overned by the Crown. The ordinance gave authority to the com-
issioner of the British East Africa protectorate to alienate, sell
nd/or lease lands, to individuals or companies, for commercial-
zation. Consequently, Africans were evicted from their customary
ands and conﬁned in designated native reserves. In Taita, two  main
ative reserves, Dabida and Sagalla were created. Later, more lands
ere alienated and declared protected areas for wildlife conserva-
ion (KLC, 1934).
In Taita, land alienated by the colonial government was leased to
arious white-owned companies for establishing large-scale sisal
nd coffee farms in the late 1920s and early 1930s. These included
he Taita concessions, Wundanyi coffee estate, Voi sisal estate and
watate sisal estates, some of which still exist, albeit under dif-
erent ownership as indicated in Fig. 1. Further, colonial reports
ndicated that land alienation by the Commissioner was  supposed
o be restricted to lands not occupied by Africans (KLC, 1934), but
his rule was sometimes contravened. Widespread evictions were
eported in the evidence produced by both natives and non-natives
o the Kenya Land Commission, whereas areas used on a seasonal
asis, such as the vast plains for hunting by the Wataita, were
ssumed to be ‘idle lands’ and alienated (KLC, 1934, pg. 2721–2725).
he colonial administration also reserved hunting and wildlife con-
ervation areas, which were set aside for an eventual national park.
4 We use colonial administration to the period 1895–1963, which covers all peri-
ds  of British rule in Kenya both as a protectorate under the British East Africa
ompany and as a colony as we are more concerned with establishment of poli-
ies, exploitation and unequal power relationships between the colonizers and their
ubjects rather than placing emphasis on subjacent dichotomies of the colonial
dministration.licy 50 (2016) 202–213
The result of these policies and actions severely altered land access
among the natives as colonial records indicate:
“Taita farming systems were dramatically altered.  . ..through the
native reserves, the Wataita were restricted to 1-2 square miles
around their hills, while large areas in the plains and hills were
converted to large-scale sisal and coffee plantations and set aside
for an eventual national park” (Mosoon, 1984, pg. 68)5
Similar land alienations and concentration of Africans into
native reserves were occurring elsewhere across the country. Key
among them was  the establishment of the white highlands by the
colony6 (Kanyinga, 2009). These were areas covering over 3 million
ha, mainly in high potential areas, reserved for European settlement
(Kanyinga, 2009). Land-based grievances among Africans started
simmering. The colonial government responded through the estab-
lishment of the Carter/Kenya Land Commission in 1932–1933 (KLC,
1932). The commission, with mainly white commissioners, was
subject to concerns over its impartiality raised among both natives
and whites, but was  tasked with adjudication of African land
grievances and determining native land rights. Speciﬁcally in Taita,
the commission was presented with evidence of native displace-
ment through the creation of large-scale estates such as Wundanyi
Estates and Teita (sic) concessions as well as the two  national parks
(KLC, 1934: 2722). The commission found human overcrowding in
areas such as the Dabida native reserves; and restriction of natives
to lands that were too small to sustain future economic production
(KLC, 1934:319). In light of this, the commission’s recommenda-
tions in Taita District included the return of small parcels such as the
Wundayi estates to the natives and the extension of native reserves
to include areas in the estates that had been cultivated by natives
or other unalienated lands (KLC, 1934: pg. 321–326).
While marginally expanding land areas available to the Wataita,
the commission’s recommendations also served to entrench the
existence of the native reserves while maintaining large parcels
occupied by whites. Native grievances persisted. Various forms of
protests and channeling of grievances through local political group-
ings and white missionaries in Taita accompanied demands for
return of native land:
“..some natives came to see me; and asked me  to convey to
you that they still wanted their land North of Voi Taveta road
returned to them, they at this time disassociate themselves with
the Kishamba natives who want to cause trouble and embarrass
the government. . . These people were the most faithful and reliable
during the [ﬁrst] world war and were instrumental in stopping the
Germans advance to Voi and Maungu. This is their reward!! A good
example of British gratitude in Kenya”  Rev Verbi letter to Taita DC,
October 16th 19397.
Socio-economic and political divisions among the natives also
arose; as some pursued land grievances through loyalty and others
through resistance. The colonial administration used land to reward
those whom they found loyal, and bypassed those who resisted.
Eventually, this produced a pattern of landed and landless among5 One of the early research reports done on colonial tenure reforms in Taita found
at  the Kenya National Archives.
6 Although the colonial period in Kenya started in 1895 when it fell under British
East  African protectorate, the country ofﬁcially became a colony in 1920. A 10-mile
coastal strip leased to the Sultan of Zanzibar remained a protectorate until Kenya’s
independence in 1963.
7 Archival records of Rev Verbi, a white missionary intervening on land injustices,
Archival ﬁle no. DC/TTA/3/8/18.
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“During the last few years, I have noticed that there is becoming
a class of landed gentry among the natives, which no doubt is a
sign of progress. However, from what I know of the improvidence
of the natives in Teita [sic], I can see that in less than 50 years’ time
probably all the land will be owned by some 100 landed gentry.”
Verbi, 1939.
In the rest of the country, and particularly in the central
ighlands of Kenya, land grievances metamorphosed into libera-
ion movements such as the Mau  Mau  movement (1952–1960)
Kanyinga, 2009). As the pressure from land-related grievances
uilt up, the colonial administration responded again with
et another nationwide programme, the Swynnerton Plan
1954–1959). This was an ambitious land consolidation and adju-
ication plan that divided the country into high potential versus
ow potential, large-scale farms versus smallholder farms and land-
olders versus the landless. The plan opened up the era of land
ommodiﬁcation, or what Shipton (2009) refers to as “land mort-
aging” through land titling, which enabled access to credit with
he land titles as collateral. Whereas the plan’s stated aims included
ncreasing crop production in the existing land holdings, its major
utcome, like the Carter Land Commission, was maintaining colo-
ial boundaries such that the natives kept the small parcels of land
nd the white farmers kept the large parcels, over which produc-
ion was then supposed to increase (Kanyinga, 1998, 2009; Kariuki,
004).
Kenya gained independence in 1963. The immediate post-
olonial government’s promises included returning lands that had
een dispossessed from Africans by the colonial administration
Kanyinga, 2009). The Lawrence Report (1966), borrowing from the
wynnerton Plan, advised that land registration in communal areas
hould be based on group rather than individual ownership. This
eport was enacted through the Group Ranch Representatives Act of
968. A group ranch was deﬁned as a livestock production system,
ased on kinship ties, traditional land rights such as tribe, clan, fam-
ly or other group (Mwangi, 2007; Ng’ethe, 1992). Consequently,
anches were established in the 1960s and 1970s mainly on trust
ands8, i.e., lands that were held on ﬁduciary basis, i.e., on behalf of
he local communities by the local councils as trustees. After inde-
endence, trust lands in Taita included former native reserves and
ast areas in the plains where the natives had been restricted from
ccess during colonial times. As such, there were no ﬁrm claims to
and ownership in these areas.
According to interviews conducted with key leaders who were
nvolved in the formation and registration of ranches, Taita ranches
ere established for the Wataita in order to help secure their lands
gainst pressure from incoming white settlers displaced from else-
here in the country after independence, as well from as other
thnic groups keen to settle in the area.
“After independence, some of local leaders from the local councils
came together to see how to contain potential inﬂux of white set-
tlers who had been displaced elsewhere in the country. . .they were
eying the vast former crown lands..  . .there were also other com-
munities gradually moving into Taita. . .we agreed to form group
ranches in order to secure lands for the Wataita. . .”  Leader 1:
former Taita Taveta county council clerk 17th April 2014.
8 Trust lands are now called community lands under the constitution of 2010.
lthough the subdivision of trust lands into group ranches was recognized and
apped at the county (former district) level in Taita Taveta, central government land
egistry and maps availed to the main author by the Kenya Institute of Survey and
apping indicated that the vast areas were undivided trusts lands since indepen-
ence, indicating an incomplete process of subdivision and mapping between the
ocal and central land registries, potentially harboring legal and practical disputes.licy 50 (2016) 202–213 209
The elites who helped the rest of the community “secure” their
lands consisted of senior ofﬁcials in the district and county coun-
cil, and local politicians. Based on present land and group ranch
ownership presented in Table 1, it appears that these elites took
advantage of the laxity in land claims and the ongoing land adjudi-
cation process and granted themselves and their cronies land leases
either as individuals, partners or shareholders in private compa-
nies. For instance, through records from the County lands ofﬁce, we
established that the former clerk interviewed was  the sole owner
of one of the ranches; while the other privately owned ranches
were mostly owned by other political elites. A few ranches were
reserved for the rest of the community through DACs, in which
members had to buy shares in the companies. The formation of
group ranches, therefore, facilitated elite capture of land, directly
or indirectly through purchase of shares in the companies.
An account of the Wataita ranch formation (Smith, 2008; p. 49)
underpins the origin of elite capture:
“while the colonial government strongly supported land consolida-
tion in Kikuyu land in response to mau mau  insurgency, in Taita,
land consolidation was pushed by educated elites in the early post-
colonial period.”
Ownership of land in the form of ranches enabled elites to access
government loans, as well as receive other incentives such as water
troughs and cattle dips for disease inoculation provided by the Min-
istry of Livestock, which was the purpose of establishing ranches
in pastoral areas (Ng’ethe 1992; Veit, 2011).
A majority of the community members joined neither DACs nor
privately owned ranches. FGDs conducted with shareholders and
non-shareholders revealed a number of reasons for the lock out:
(i) most people were not aware of the importance of registration
and assumed that even without registration, communal lands still
belonged to them; (ii) legal limitation of memberships in various
entities, such as partnerships (two people), private companies (l50
people). These were also covertly formed by friends, families, or
clans, excluding others; (iii) lack of capital and reluctance to sell or
exchange their cows for ranch shares—Taita District Development
Plan of 1974–1978 indicated that each share was equivalent to one
cow or Ksh. 20; (iv) exclusion of immigrants (e.g., according to the
Wataita, the Waduruma were not entitled to claim land in Taita, and
(v) corruption through the adjudication process where claimants
were removed from registers.
The land adjudication and consolidation policies and processes
initiated by the post-colonial government, and particularly the for-
mation of the ranches, produced a few elite people with extensive
tracts of land in the ranches, and a majority of landless people
and smallholders with land holdings far too small for any viable
economic activity. The district development plan (1974–1978)
summed it up:
“After land consolidation. . .approximately 30% of the people in the
district are either legally landless or on sub-economic units. The
average farm size is extremely small and 63% of the total farms
in the upper areas are less than 1.5 acres.” Taita Taveta District
Development Plan 1974–1978.
Over the years, the ranches experienced several problems
that led to their eventual collapse. These included environmen-
tal problems such as ﬁres and drought, human-wildlife conﬂict
and mismanagement (Njogu, 2006). However, the most critical
problem was the termination of the government-supported and
internationally funded, Kenya Livestock Development Programme,
resulting in drying up of funds and extension services provided to
ranches (Ng’ethe, 1992: Njogu, 2006). The loans that the ranches
had acquired through local banking sectors could not be repaid,
which left most ranches in debt (Ng’ethe, 1992). Some ranches
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eased ranching activities altogether and leased their lands to pas-
oralists of Somali decent. Others operated on credit while servicing
ubstantial debt. The ranch owners were, therefore, receptive to the
dea of a carbon project, which would help them generate income
rom their lands.
Interview respondents and focus group discussions also
evealed displacement of Waduruma from the privately owned
ukinga ranch before the project started. The Waduruma, who  were
haracterized by the project as poor, landless, polygamists, immi-
rants who cleared land aggressively and snared wildlife for food,
ere displaced a few years before the onset of the project:
“The other community within the project area is largely made up of
Duruma peoples, from the Coast of Kenya. The Duruma are one of
the poorest tribes in Kenya.  . .local lore has it that they ﬁrst came to
the project area in the early 1990s when they were promised land
by a local Taita politician who had taken a Duruma wife in return
for their votes in local elections. The only problem was he promised
them land he did not own that is within the project area. . ..with
single parent families that would clear the land aggressively. . .and
teenage males who would snare [wildlife] for food..” (KCRP, 2011,
pg. 24).
Our interviews indicated that the same politician, who lured
ome of the Waduruma into Taita in order to gain their votes, was
he former clerk to the council that had been part of the elite group
nvolved in the formation of group ranches.
Left legally landless during the formation of the ranches, a
ajority of the Waduruma had settled in the privately owned
ukinga ranch and lived there for decades. After the present owner
ought the ranch in the late 1990s, the Waduruma were unwel-
ome and ﬁnally evicted in 2002. A focus group discussion held
ith the displaced Waduruma referred to violence in the evictions,
s one of the participants narrated:
“In late 2001 we were told we had to move from [Rukinga ranch]
by our then Chiefs–Rowland Mwamboga, assistant Chief Ngati of
Marungu and Chief Kizaka of Kasigau. . ..  . . We  were told that
Rukinga was under a different owner (Mike Korchinksy) and not
Meyers whom we had known all along. . ..  We  were also told the
new owner was not interested in livestock, but conserving wild ani-
mals. The eviction notice was abrupt and took us by surprise. . ..In
2002, we were violently evicted, all our possessions, including food
grains, animals and clothes were thrown out of our houses, which
were immediately torched by ﬁre. We  were more than 500 house-
holds in total. We  organized ourselves in groups and hired lorries to
salvage what we could, we put our animals, food and beddings in
the lorries.  . .whatever was left behind was lost in ﬁre. . .We  hate to
be reminded and to talk about it. . ..”  Narrator 1, FGD, Dimbwini
area 1, April 2014.
The respondents indicated they attempted but failed in legal
edress to challenge the evictions from land that was  now pri-
ate property. Those who could afford land elsewhere went and
ought it. Others, such as the group we held discussions with in
he Dimbwini area, were still squatters on portions of government
and, which they were attempting to secure titles over.
. Discussion and conclusions
.1. Discussion
Our ﬁndings indicate that within the REDD+ project, land tenure
as critical in determining distribution of beneﬁts, which was
omplicated by the many different forms of tenure in the project
rea. The main project beneﬁts were derived from revenue from
ale of carbon credits, which were distributed amongst the projectlicy 50 (2016) 202–213
itself, landowners, and surrounding communities. The land own-
ers received their contractual one-third share of the revenue. The
project then deducted its costs, which in 2011 and 2012 exceeded
half the total revenue, and the communities received what was
left, amounting to less than one sixth of total revenue. This diverges
markedly from the one-third share for each constituent group origi-
nally intended albeit that the project implementation also provided
employment for an estimated 400 people, many from the local
communities.
Ranch ownership by individuals and private companies, ensured
that these landowners received much greater income from carbon
than the rest of the community. Ranch ownership comprised ﬁve
that were owned individually (one or two persons); four by private
companies limited to 50 shareholders and; four by Directed Agri-
cultural Companies (DACs) with membership based on widespread
share ownership. Some community members with shares in the
DACs received direct cash beneﬁts in the form of dividends, but
the proportion of people owning shares varied widely amongst
communities from 16% to 47% with most only owning very few
shares. The majority of local people beneﬁted only from the rev-
enue allocated to their community, but were negatively affected
by the restrictions imposed by the project on access to land for
cultivation, hunting, charcoal production and ﬁrewood collection.
For the project to demonstrate additionality, these activities had to
be stopped. Some authors point out the potential loss of revenues
(usually for the poorest groups of rural communities in Sub Saharan
Africa) associated with “locking up forests” under REDD+ projects,
notably by restricting extraction of ﬁrewood and production of
charcoal. This often results in displacing such activities elsewhere
i.e. beyond the REDD+ project zone (Fisher et al., 2011).
Prior to the project, landowners did not use their land inten-
sively, leasing it out for grazing at low returns, and so had no major
disbeneﬁt from the restrictions that the REDD+ project imposed.
On the contrary, the project led to landowners, despite often being
absentees, imposing greater control over their land, while “illegal
squatters” were “peacefully removed” (WW,  2014). Project ofﬁcials
emphasised that some of the activities that communities engaged
in, like charcoal burning, were illegal under Kenyan law. But charoal
burning is actually allowed for in the charcoal regulations of 2009
(GoK, 2009b), which sought to legalize it, after many failed attempts
at a total ban.
Analyzing the project through the lens of present tenure
arrangements and the distribution of beneﬁts clearly shows that
equity concerns were taken into account in project design. In prin-
ciple, residents of the settlement areas have no legal claim to any
carbon revenue, because the project covers an area that mostly
belongs to private ranch owners. Yet they do receive a modest pro-
portion of carbon revenues (14% directly, plus ﬂows from project
implementation and share ownership in some ranches). The dis-
tributional principles chosen by the project conform to notions of
equity and practicality with three main elements. First, the project
recognizes that, the lack of equity in tenure arrangements that are
the basis for revenue allocation, would not be tenable as a dis-
tributive mechanism without some modiﬁcation. Present tenure
arrangements favor a few private ranch owners and exclude the
majority of poor smallholders in the area who bore the greatest
costs. Without beneﬁts, poor smallholders might not support the
project and continue clearing land for farming and cutting trees for
charcoal production. This would compromise the project’s ability to
demonstrate additionality of carbon storage (Minang and Noord-
wijk, 2013). Secondly, without demonstrating that they attempt
to address the lack of legal rights to tenure and carbon beneﬁts,
the project would face problems in obtaining GOLD level certiﬁca-
tion by CCBA. Thirdly, for ethical reasons, because key people in the
project believe it is just, although notions of justice have often been
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ound to differ amongst actors, and particularly amongst project
mplementers and local communities (He and Sikor, 2015).
Our tracing of the evolution of land tenure, revealed how the
resent arrangements are the result of a historical process of
ispossession. Through colonial land policies, the Wataita were dis-
ossessed of their customary lands, which were turned into sisal
nd coffee estates and the rest reserved as national parks. Other
olonial land use policies, such as the Swynnerton Plan, presided
ver an era of land commodiﬁcation, titling and mortgaging in
xchange for loans to increase land productivity (Kanyinga, 2009;
hipton, 2009). Post-colonial policies and political actors mirrored
he colonial ones, characterized by primitive land grabbing by polit-
cal elites, turning land that was supposed to revert to communities
pon independence into private and partnership ranch holdings as
vident in the Ndung’u9 report. The dispossessions were consistent
ith others witnessed in Taita-Taveta county, coastal region, and
ther parts of Kenya (Chomba et al., 2014; Kanyinga 1998; Mwangi,
007a; Rutten, 1997).
The point in time of particular relevance to this discourse, was
he formation of group ranches in Taita, where trust lands were
ubdivided in the name of securing communal tenure, only to end
p in the hands of a few elite families. This process was  legally facil-
tated under the land adjudication Act (CAP 287 of 1968, revised in
010) which allowed trust lands to be adjudicated to claimants and
on-claimants as either individuals or groups (GoK, 1968). Then the
roup Representative Act CAP 287 of 1970 revised in 2012, adjudi-
ated land under group ownership where the group was deﬁned as
 tribe, clan, section, family or other group of persons (GoK, 1970).
he two laws, enabled individuals, groups and companies to reg-
ster as legal claimants of former communal (trust) lands. In areas
ike Taita, where there were vast lands with no ﬁrm communal
laims, this appears to have created the legal and practical oppor-
unity for elite capture. These laws, which are awaiting repeal upon
he passing of the new community land bill (2014), as stipulated
nder Kenya’s 2010 constitution, have facilitated huge inequali-
ies and loss of property rights through individualization of former
ommunal property.
This process is not conﬁned to Taita but has played out in differ-
nt ways in other parts of Kenya (Hughes, 2006; Mwangi, 2007b;
utten, 1997). Mwangi (2007b) argues that the transition from col-
ective to individual rights indicates a rational response aimed at
ecuring land claims against internal and external aggressors by
ocal communities. In Taita however, the elite captured land rights
t the onset of transition from collective property (trust lands),
here ownership was transferred to individuals and various forms
f companies, thereby excluding other Wataita.
The overall result of land consolidation and property rights tran-
ition was exclusion of the majority of poorer households from
egal ownership of land. Group ranches have also been found to
xclude other marginalized groups such as women and young peo-
le (Rutten, 1997). Minor ethnic groups such as the Waduruma,
ere labelled as immigrants and illegal squatters, and consequently
victed by the colonial government, ignored by the post-colonial
overnments and “peaceably removed” by private land owners to
reate a wildlife sanctuary in the project area, just before the onset
f the project (WW,  2014a).
9 The Ndung’u commission of inquiry into illegal/irregular allocations of public
and was  established in 2003, chaired by Paul Ndung’u, after whom the commission
nd its widely famous report came to be known. The Ndung’u report released in
004 found extensive evidence of land grabbing by public ofﬁcials in, among other
reas, settlement schemes and trust lands, and recommended revocation of the
ame. However, the ﬁndings and recommendations of the commission are yet to be
roperly implemented due to vested interests among the political elites, who are
lso named as key beneﬁciaries.licy 50 (2016) 202–213 211
It is upon these very uneven tenure arrangements that the
project was overlaid. Although it attempted to address lack of
equity through its beneﬁt distribution mechanism, to achieve
equity, we argue, the project would have needed to adopt a more
re-distributive model to offset the accumulated inequality in land
tenure. It also needed to show greater diligence in ensuring that
smallholders received their intended share of beneﬁts.
In relation to the wider REDD+ debate, our ﬁndings support
those of other scholars who  emphasize the critical role that tenure
arrangements play in determining equity with respect to access
to REDD+ beneﬁts (Cotula and Mayers, 2009; Larson, 2011; Larson
et al., 2013; Naughton-Treves and Wendland, 2014). Several stud-
ies assert that tenure arrangements are critical for the realization of
social and livelihood outcomes, speciﬁcally because they determine
who can beneﬁt from what resources, under what conditions and
for how long (Corbera et al., 2011; Duchelle et al., 2014; Murdiyarso
et al., 2012; Sunderlin et al., 2014). What emerges from these
analyses is that, clarity and security of tenure are key to effective
implementation of REDD+ and for enabling access to beneﬁts.
Our present analysis emphasizes the need to go beyond clariﬁ-
cation of existing tenure that has emerged from previous studies,
to consider the equity inherent in the present mosaic of land own-
ership and how it came about (See also Krause and Loft, 2013). In
such cases, tenure clarity and security is no guarantee of equity
when land is concentrated in the hands of a few and carbon rights
are linked to ownership of land. Under such circumstances, formal-
ization of tenure rights, without addressing underlying inequality
in land ownership, will not result in equitable distribution of REDD+
beneﬁts, but rather a further reinforcing of inequality. Other schol-
ars have also challenged the process of formalizing land tenure, and
argue that the process neither leads to security of tenure nor the
assumed economic beneﬁts, particularly in Africa (Bromley, 2009;
Shipton, 2009). Often, the process of formalizing tenure results in
a transfer of land from common ownership by local communities
to powerful individuals (Mwangi, 2007; Peluso and Lund, 2011).
This focus on tenure clarity and security arguably reﬂects what
has been coined as neoliberal thinking, in which land privatization
and titling is seen as the most effective means of securing capi-
tal, promoting economic growth, and reducing poverty (Deininger
2003; De Soto, 2003). Yet these assertions are not new; colonial
and post-colonial land reforms in most parts of Africa have focused
on land privatization and titling, supposedly to ensure tenure clar-
ity, security and enabling of capital acquisition by using land titles
as collateral (Simbizi et al., 2014; Shipton, 2009). The outcomes of
these processes include marginalization of people based on gen-
der, class and ethnicity, while deepening social conﬂicts (Kariuki
2004; Peters, 2004). Our present analysis, centers on these issues
of colonial and post-colonial social differentiation, resulting from
land grabbing, and primitive capital accumulation, that are perti-
nent to many countries across Africa (Cousins et al., 1992; Moore,
2001). Disguised as agrarian reform and formalization of tenure,
these processes lead to beneﬁts for the minority at the expense of
the majority in the society, as demonstrated here in the context
of REDD+. We  refer to this as the roots of inequity, which are akin
to roots of starvation (Sen, 1983) or roots of vulnerability (Ribot,
2014).
5.2. Conclusions
We found in the Kasigau case, that while REDD+ project imple-
menters sought to address equity in designing their beneﬁt sharing
mechanism, in practice they fell short of expectations. This was
both because the historical context predetermined very unequal
land ownership, and because of preferential allocation of beneﬁt
ﬂows to landowners and project implementation, at the expense of
the wider community. The additional value that REDD+ brought to
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and and vegetation in the area, created the conditions for landown-
rs to re-assert their control over their land at the expense of people
n local communities, who had previously beneﬁted from squatting,
arming, hunting, ﬁrewood collection and charcoal production.
There is a clear tension in practical implementation of REDD+
nitiatives where historical injustices have led to dispossessions
nd disparities in land ownership. Starting from very unequal land
istribution, it is unlikely that beneﬁt ﬂows tied to carbon stor-
ge on speciﬁc land areas, will be large enough, within any feasible
istribution model, to signiﬁcantly affect overall equity. Measures
eeded to address historical dispossessions and disparities in land
enure are the remit of governments, as the recommendations
f the Ndung’u Commission and the recent establishment of the
ational Land Commission in Kenya attest. REDD+ initiatives, how-
ver, need to go further than working only to clarify and secure
and tenure, if they are to create incentives for government to
ddress equity. The implication is that social safeguards associated
ith REDD+ need to be speciﬁc with respect to land tenure where
chemes extend over private as well as public land.
The fundamental constraint imposed by the size of beneﬁt ﬂows
n equitable outcomes, is further aggravated by the tendency for
mplementation of REDD+ to tighten control over land and access
o resources derived from it, by whoever owns it. For a REDD+ ini-
iative to get off the ground, landowners need to take part, but in
oing so they reinforce the existing land tenure arrangement. In
he Kasigau case, the wider community, including those with no
enure over land, did receive some beneﬁt from REDD+. So the key
uestions become, how large these beneﬁts should be to adequately
ddress equity, and whose perspective on equity determines this?
t is well established that what project implementers and other
takeholders consider equitable may  differ from those of local com-
unities. This makes it critical for REDD+ projects to frame equity
ransparently and through a participatory process that includes
 multiplicity of voices. Given the nature of equity, it is unlikely
here will be consensus on whether or not it has been achieved,
equiring that policy-makers demand of project implementers and
ertiﬁers/evaluators that they give voice to the weaker parties;
hose with less resources and opportunities to make their voices
eard. This, in and of itself, could be a route to realizing greater
quity.
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